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Introduction 
 
Populism has undergone a revival in Western politics over the past few decades. Right-wing 
populist parties have won seats in the European Parliament, and the Tea Party has become a 
powerful lobbying influence in the United States. There are many recurrent themes shared by 
populist movements throughout different liberal democracies. They revolve around an 
opposition against the current powers or power structure in such a democracy.  Margaret 
Canovan typifies populism as an “an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established 
structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society.”1 
The point of a populist movement is that it claims to focus on the majority’s concerns, 
which are consistently neglected by those in power. Of course, these claims are debatable, as 
populists rarely get a majority vote in elections. According to French scholar Pierre Rosanvallon, 
populists discuss this negligence with a moral distinction between the “society” and the “elite”, 
the latter of which is depicted as being “cut off from any authentic connection with society”. 2 
 This movement is often met with scorn among intellectuals and scholars, who 
themselves are often under populist scrutiny. Critics of populism maintain that populists appeal 
to unrealistic wishes or demands from the people, capitalizing on the practical impossibility of a 
direct democracy, higher wages or better weather by adhering to unrealistic party programs. 3 
Populism is generally used as a pejorative term by scholars who say populist movements are 
often incompatible with modern-day liberal values.4 Both Canovan and Rosanvallon condemn 
the populist approach to democracy, noting that it “accompanies democracy like a shadow.”5 
Rosanvallon warns us that the critical basis of populism, its demand for simplicity and clarity, 
can develop into “a pathology of oversight and vigilance.”6 In other words, although the desire 
for clarity is not harmful in itself, populism takes it two steps too far, to the point where it 
                                                                 
1
 Margaret Canovan, "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy," Political Studies 47, 
no. 1 (1999): 3.  
2
 Pierre Rosanvallon, Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 266. 
3
 Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, (Chatham, NJ.: Chatham House Publishers, 1987), 
7-8. 
4
 David Beetham, "Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratization," Political Studies 40 (1992): 41. 
5
 Canovan, "Trust the People!,” 17. 
6
 Rosanvallon, Counter-Democracy, 268. 
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hinders the democratic process by demonizing the authority of the democratically chosen 
government.  
To Canovan, the only redemptive aspect of populism is that it sheds light on the 
inherent contradictions within a liberal democracy. On the one hand, a liberal democracy gives 
people the possibility to process conflicts without violence, but on the other hand it 
presupposes that the country is run entirely by its own people. Naturally, those in charge have 
to take charge, which means that not all conflicting demands from the people can be resolved. 
This leads to tension between the rulers and the ruled. Canovan argues that it is this 
fundamental paradox on which populists thrive.7 
Although these criticisms ring true for populists everywhere, I will focus on American 
populism, which has its own tradition, predating even the country’s independence. The question 
I want to answer in this thesis is whether the commonly accepted critical view on populism is 
too blunt. Is there a positive side to a populist approach to current-day events? In general, 
scholars frown upon populist approaches to history or current affairs. I intend to show that this 
is not always justified, and will do so predominantly with reference to the work of William 
Greider, author, former reporter and editor for the Washington Post, and currently a 
correspondent for The Nation. His major works contain heavily populist elements, which I will 
analyze in detail. I wish to research the merit of his work by examining the extent to which it fits 
into the populist patterns. To this end I will focus predominately on his book on the Federal 
Reserve, Secrets of the Temple, and his critique on the modern American democratic system, 
Who Will Tell the People. Through analysis of the critical reception of these works I hope to 
identify the benefits and drawbacks of this approach. Finally, I hope to give a decisive word on 
the merits of the populist tone in Greider’s writing. Does Greider’s work support Rosanvallon’s 
thesis that populism is anti-democratic? Or does his work show that a populist approach 
perspective can be informative? 
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 Chapter I: Continuing a Tradition 
The Rise of Populism 
 
Populism is a multifaceted word, used in many different contexts. With a capital P, and in 
American history, it refers to the late 19th-century People’s Party, a party that fought for 
farmers’ and laborers’ rights in the face of increasingly large banks and corporations. The 
People's Party aimed to protect the economically independent farmers and workers from the 
looming larger corporations, which were steadily increasing their hold on land and financial 
assets. Due to the monopolization of railroads, farmers were forced to pay exorbitant shipping 
rates on their goods. The influence of monopolists on state legislature fueled a growing 
discontent among the farmers. This was added to the grievances caused by the crop-lien 
system. For seeds, tools and food, the farmers were often forced to mortgage their upcoming 
harvest. To finance this year’s necessities, they had to contract the sale of crops that were still 
growing. If the harvest was poor, they would have to relieve their debt by mortgaging plants 
they hadn’t even sowed. If the harvest was plentiful, it would depress prices – devaluing their 
crops, meaning the farmers would have to sell more than assumed to level their debts.  
 Combined with the money shortage of the post-Civil War United States, farmers’ 
dependency on monopolists worsened their economic position during the following decades. 
The deflation caused by money shortage was detrimental for all debtors, as it meant their debts 
increased in value. This effect was enhanced by the abolition of silver as legal tender in 1873. 
Creditors became richer, meaning wealth became more and more concentrated. This led to 
increased discontent in the lower economic echelons of both agrarian and urban society.8 
Wage earners were marginalized in their personal agency for several reasons. The 
overabundance of personal debt and available labor meant they had little choice in what kind of 
work they did – employers had access to plenty of people, especially immigrant workers, to 
replace difficult employees. On the other hand, many employers were owned by the same 
corporation, leading to what was in effect a wage cartel. If wage earners tried to combine forces 
in opposition to the corporations, they were often harshly dealt with by hired muscle. 9  
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Farmers as well as laborers had already often joined forces in Farmers’ Alliances or 
Labor Organizations. Farmers’ Alliances arose quickly in the South and West, and sought to 
strengthen the farmers’ positions by unifying them. Together, they could invest in seeds and 
equipment. This would enable them to bypass the unreasonable prices demanded by local 
retailers. At the same time, they hoped to agree on set prices for their crops, thus reducing their 
vulnerability to market volatility.10 Farmers’ Alliances spread out through most agrarian 
communities in the United States. They formed a community-based approach to problems that 
troubled all independent farmers, one of which was the poor availability of education. Farmers 
lacked the funds to attend universities, and often had no information on the latest scientific 
developments in farming. Before the rise of the Alliances, they had no way of learning about 
agrarian developments, or local and global economy. Leaders of the various chapters stressed 
the importance of education, and farmers pooled books together, establishing chapter libraries, 
and together subscribed to various weekly newspapers, which provided information on agrarian 
scientific developments. The Farmers’ Alliances also started  educating members on practical 
matters such as bookkeeping, crop yields, price rates, loans and other knowledge needed to do 
business. Farming was no longer an occupation for the uneducated. 11 By buying tools, 
knowledge and resources in bulk, the Alliances strengthened farmers' positions. 
Similarly, laborers combined their efforts in various labor organizations such as the 
National Labor Union and, stimulated by the Union’s collapse in 1873, the Knights of Labor. 
These organizations aimed to unify laborers in a coherent front against big corporations, 
strengthening their positions by striking, or by rationing the coal supply in order to regulate 
prices, comparable to what Farmer Alliances did with crops. There was also a lot of overlap 
between farmers and laborers, as many farmers were miners off-season, and many miners 
maintained some crops for sustenance.12 
 From 1889 through 1892, the various Farmers’ Alliances and Labor Organizations started 
grouping together, eventually supporting the Omaha Platform on July 4, 1892. With it, the 
People’s Party was formed.13 The Platform called for the restoration of power to the people: 
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 Canovan, Populism, 26-7. 
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 Charles Postel, The Populist Vision (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 50-5. 
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 Postel, The Populist Vision, 19-20. 
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[W]e seek to restore the government of the Republic to the hands of “the plain people,” 
with which class it originated. We assert our purposes to be identical with the purposes 
of the National Constitution; to form a more perfect union and establish justice, insure 
[sic] domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general 
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.14 
 
The Omaha Platform strived for the nationalization of railroads and communications 
infrastructure, re-introduction of silver as legal tender, reduction of immigration, eight-hour 
working days, abolition of “the Pinkerton system”15, introduction of referendums, directly 
chosen senators and several other rather revolutionary initiatives.  
 
In the development of the Farmers’ Alliances and Labor Organizations toward the People’s 
Party, we can discern a few themes which return in our understanding of populism today. They 
include the distinction between “the people” and “the other”, but also an inquisitive attitude 
concerning the extent to which a democracy can represent every single citizen. Further, just like 
populists today, the People's Party focused on informing “the people”, based on the supposition 
that “the people” were kept in the dark. It should not surprise us that the responsibility for this 
misinformation rests with “the elite”: “the people” are absolved, and must be weary of anything 
proposed by the elite. This distrust towards authority also plays a major part in populist 
movements. 
Historians’ evaluations of the Populists vary widely. Some  historical scholars, like 
Michael Kazin, emphasize the progressive approach. Others, like Richard Hofstadter, feel the 
Populist perception of the world was too simplistic, primitive and idealistic. Hofstadter identifies 
a nostalgia throughout the Populist movement, a longing for an ideal time that, in reality, never 
existed. This glorification was part of the Populist Party’s appeal to the displeased masses .16 
Hofstadter argues that Populists only distinguished between the “monopolies, the money 
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 Populist Party, Omaha Platform, accessed February 10, 2015, 
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Omaha_Platform  
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 The Omaha Platform uses ‘the Pinkerton system’ as shorthand for what they call  “a large army of 
standing mercenaries.” The Pinkerton Detective Agency, founded in 1850, expanded its services during 
the 19
th
 century to include private security, as well as military contracting work. The Pinkertons became 
infamous for their violent suppression of labor strikes, as well as their efforts to force upcoming labor 
unions to disband. 
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 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform : From Bryan to F.D.R. (London, Cape, 1962), 24. 
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power” and “all other people who produce wealth.”17 Populists warned of “the destruction of 
civilization” if they did not win the next election, and recognized their problems as the results of 
a “sustained conspiracy of the international money power”.18 Hofstadter portrays the Populists 
as uneducated, anti-Semitic and Anglophobic, emphasizing their xenophobic nationalism.19 This 
approach to Populism still resonates in the common academic opinion of modern-day populism. 
 
 
 
Understanding Modern Populism 
 
The popular reform writer Henry George’s 1879 Poverty and Progress was exemplary for how 
power relations would later be seen in the Populist movement: 
 
In theory we are intense democrats. Yet growing among us is a class who have all the 
power of the aristocracy— without any of their virtues. A few men control thousands of 
miles of railroad, millions of acres of land, and the livelihood of thousands. They name 
the governors as they name clerks, and choose senators as they choose attorneys. Their 
will with legislatures is as supreme as a French king’s.20 
 
This passage illustrates one of the most defining recurrent elements of populist discourse: the 
demarcation between “us”, the democrats, and “them”, the aristocrats without virtue. “We, the 
people”21 occupy the moral high ground, whereas the elite has the power. The democratic 
majority is pitted against the powerful elite in a distinction that is based on wealth and power, 
not on generation or race.22 This elite can take on different forms, depending on the context. For 
                                                                 
17
 Ibid., 64. 
18
 Ibid., 70-4. 
19
 Ibid., 88.  
20
 Henry George. Progress & Poverty, ed. Bob Drake (Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 2006), 291. 
21
 Throughout this paper, I will  use ‘‘the people”’ (in quotation marks) in this sense of the word: majority 
of oppressed people as assumed in populist arguments. 
22
 Jack Newfield, and Jeff Greenfield, A Populist Manifesto : The Making of a New Majority (Warner 
Paperback Library: New York, 1972), 28-9. 
It should also be noted that white People’s Party Populists catered to the black minority in order to gain 
votes, but at the same time tried to distance themselves from emancipatory movements. (Kazin, The 
 
10 
 
example, according to Rosanvallon, modern “[p]opulists denounce ‘otherness’ in moral terms 
(by vilifying the ‘corrupt’ and ‘rotten’), in social terms (by condemning ‘elites’) and in ethnic 
terms (by attacking ‘foreigners,’ ‘immigrants,’ ‘minorities,’ etc.).”23 They are able to create the 
illusion of a homogeneous people by finding a common enemy in a minority, and blaming that 
group for the hardships the majority has to bear. This is why populist movements are often 
related to or associated with xenophobia and racism. We can recognize these patterns in the 
People’s Party: Populists refrained from acknowledging the black minori ty as equals, and vilified 
monied businessmen, monopolists and politicians.  
We can see how Populists strengthened their own identity by denouncing “the 
plutocracy,” the wealthy elite that kept “the plain people” down. This “other” was the reason 
that the great American democracy was not working properly, which brings us to the 
“restoration” of “the government of the republic to ‘the real people’” mentioned in the Omaha 
Platform.  
Rosanvallon typifies populism as an ideology, an inversion of everything democracy 
stands for: “an extreme form of anti-politics”. On the one hand, it is concerned with an absolute 
democratic power for “the people” (as opposed to “the others”, who are considered damaging 
to the society). On the other hand, Rosanvallon recognizes three recurrent populist tendencies: 
pathological oversight, negative sovereignty, and politics as judgment, all three explained below. 
As quoted in the introduction, Rosanvallon argues populists are pathologically watchful, 
to the extent that all authority – even if democratically chosen – becomes villainous. This 
suspicious oversight goes so far that every action taken by the government can be painted in a 
negative light. This results in populists defining sovereignty in a negative sense, which is to say 
as not having one’s “freedom” inhibited by government policy. Together with the search for 
“others” to be opposed to, this leads to a subversion of any actions undertaken by the 
government. Rosanvallon sees this as a manifestation of directionless anger of the masses. 
Finally, he discusses the notion that “the people” should be able to judge through politics, 
stating that the “only justice in which it is interested is the justice of repression, punishment, 
and stigmatization of those whom it condemns as ‘undesirables’ and ‘parasites.’” His take on 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Populist Persuasion, 41) Most of the Populist adherents were opposed to racial equality, and feared the 
recently freed blacks working for large plantation owners, seeing them as all ies of the elite. 
23
 Rosanvallon, Counter-Democracy, 266. 
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populism is that it is a negative force in politics, “an acute manifestation of contemporary 
political disarray and a tragic expression of our inability to overcome it.”24 
We can understand the first two elements Rosanvallon signifies with help from 
Margaret Canovan’s interpretation of popul ism:  
 
Populism in modern democratic societies is best seen as an appeal to “the people” 
against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of 
the society.25  
 
She further elaborates on this interpretation in the context of a democratic system. She typifies 
populism as a three-pronged argument. First, it assumes “the people” are the foundation of the 
community: any authority has to be in accordance with its people. Second, it states that the 
society’s government neglects the opinion of its people – their “rightful primacy” has been 
taken from them. Finally, the populist argument states that “the people” must “be restored to 
their proper place” and “society regenerated.”26 
This line of arguments is often disputable, but nonetheless persuasive to many – most 
people feel wronged in one way or another, and populists often provide a convenient 
scapegoat, namely those in power. It brings us back to the paradox inherent to a liberal 
democracy: how can politicians and policymakers cater to the diverse and contradictory 
demands of “the people”? Some people will always feel aggrieved by certain decisions, even 
though running a country requires people to make those decisions. This leads us to the next 
question: to what extent can a government decide what is best for its citizens or, more bluntly, 
that a certain policy is for the people’s own best will, even if they don’t agree with it?  
Without stepping into the philosophical morass that finding a clear-cut answer would 
be, we can recognize that this question is a recurrent theme in populist arguments. The 
government, even if chosen by the people, is in a position where it needs to exercise power over 
people who will not always agree with its decisions. Once the assumption is made that it is not 
truly the people who are in charge, but a power-hungry elite, all the other populist tendencies 
fall into place: the government does not represent “the people”, politicians must be scrutinized, 
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and the people must be restored to power. For the Populists it was evident that “the 
plutocracy” benefited highly from the way the United States were governed, despite the fact 
that the majority of the people were at a disadvantage. Most modern populist arguments follow 
the same construction – whether they are accurate or not is another question.  
 
 
  
On the Importance of Being Educated 
 
Despite Hofstadter’s allegations that Populists were provincial simpletons at heart, members of 
the People’s Party stressed the importance of educating their followers. Especially among the 
members of Farmers’ Alliances, it was common practice to hold lectures and share information 
resources. Academically schooled farmers researched the possibilities of new farming 
techniques and tried to make those accessible to the entire agrarian class. The Populists 
adhered to the idea that progress, which meant the improvement of rural life, presupposed the 
leveling of the education gap.27 This education mobilized the rural population from the bottom 
up. 
 
Educational progress, they believed, constituted the great equalizer in commerce, 
technology, and social standing. And it conformed to their understanding of power 
within the dynamics of a modern world. Among their collective grievances, agrarian 
reformers bitterly assailed the monopolists' grip on "sources of intelligence" and access 
to knowledge.28 
 
Once again, we can see the distinction between “the people” and “the elite”, the latter having 
access to information, the former being represented as being wronged. Populists stressed the 
significance of education and scientific progress, searching for “a scientific understanding of 
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their place in nature and society.”29 The Populists did not, like certain populist movements 
today, denounce science in favor of uncritical religious faith.30  
 The significance of education is still understood by populist movements. Today’s 
populists see themselves as informers, spreading the word on the various instances of 
misconduct in the country’s government. Denouncing the mainstream (“lamestream”31) media 
as a tool of “the elite”, populists use a different approach to inform their followers of their 
values. By holding speeches and directly contacting their following, they are able to “educate” 
“the people” on the core beliefs of their party programs, the deeper truths to which “the 
people” were held ignorant by “the elite”.  
 
 
 
Reception of populism 
 
We can start to see why Rosanvallon’s definition of populism as an ideology is too narrow. To 
understand the full significance of populism, we need to understand its use in political 
programs, but also its brother connotations. In modern media, “populism” is often used to 
indicate a “preference of the masses”. In commercials, it is used to indicate that thousands of 
Americans prefer that product, rather than another one, thus conveying an inferiority of 
alternatives.32 Just like the Populist movement, this commercial application influences how we 
understand and discuss the term. To Canovan, populism “is a matter of political style and tactics, 
not of particular policy commitments.”33 According to Kazin, “people employed populism as a 
flexible mode of persuasion. They used traditional kinds of expressions, tropes, themes, and 
images to convince large numbers of Americans to join their side or to endorse their views on 
particular issues.”34 In order words, populism can be understood as a way of speaking, a manner 
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 Ibid., 266. 
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 Dan Merica, “Poll: Tea party opinions of global warming, evolution problematic for GOP.” CNN Religion 
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of framing events and opinions to influence how people will react to them, not just a political 
movement or ideology. It is a manner of persuasion, for which it has been academically vilified.  
 By using hollow phrases like “big government” or “tax and spend,” populists aim to elicit 
an emotional response from the public. They aim for a gut reaction, rather than a well -
considered vote. When President Ronald Reagan delivered his infamous one-liner “The nine 
most terrifying words in the English language are: I'm from the government and I'm here  to 
help,”35 he was not making a rational argument. A critical listener might wonder what Reagan, a 
government leader himself, is doing, if not “helping” the public.36 An emotional audience, 
however, will react with gut instinct: many people are brought to believe they should fear the 
government when it comes to personal affairs. By moving away from rational management and 
toward emotional response, populists hollow out the democratic process.  
 This, amplified by populism’s high visibility, attracts a great deal of criticism. The idea 
that the population of any country, let alone that of the United States, known for its “melting-
pot” population, shares anything beyond the country’s geographical borders, is nowadays 
perceived as naive and short-sighted at best. Populists (although this can be said for politicians 
in general) often claim to represent people whose interests they do not have at heart. 
Furthermore, people do not always care about the most important problems: a strong 
standpoint on a relatively minor issue can attract a great amount of support, even if careful 
analysis indicates that there are more urgent matters. In other words: “the people” do not 
always realize what is best.37 This is exemplified by their frequent opposition to regulatory 
agencies, such as the Federal Reserve, as we will investigate in detail in the following chapter.  
 Regulatory agencies often bear the brunt of populist critique, as they exemplify the 
practical implications of a country's authority. It is through regulatory agencies that a 
government is able to put its policy in practice. Agencies like the Environmental Protection 
Agency or the Drug Enforcement Administration have impact on people's lives, making them an 
easy target for populists. Rosanvallon stresses the importance of these agencies in the 
legitimization of a government: by defining boundaries for citizens and corporations, a 
government can protect the values its people hold dear, thus proving its value. Immune to 
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partisan pressure, they should be able to define a policy that transcends the government in 
charge, in order to guarantee stability.38 These agencies’ effectiveness can be evaluated 
according to four features:  
 
[I]solation from political pressure and independence of the executive; impartiality; 
[their] ability to implement long-range policies not subject to the vagaries of elections; 
and [the] ability to formulate coherent, rational policies.39 
 
As populists generally oppose the seated powers, they also question the legitimacy of 
these regulatory agencies. This is why populism is typified as anti -politics by Rosanvallon, as they 
attack at least one of the legitimating pieces of the country’s lawmakers. Populism is an effort to 
capture the anger of “the people” in a movement against authority. In other words, Rosanvallon 
sees populism as a movement against politics, rather than a movement for something else.40 
Because he understands regulatory agencies as a legitimating force in democracy, he sees 
populist critique of their policy as a threat to democracy. Hence his argument that proper 
regulatory policy, which would encompass more of a country’s constituency’s demands, would 
alleviate populist pressure on the government. In other words, regulatory agencies can actually 
aid in solving the problem of populism. 
The populist idea that a country's population can be represented by referring to a single 
“people” is the source of most allegations of “anti-politics”. It does not correspond to the way 
the world works, but is an attractive idea.41 Populism is a method used to promote vastly 
different movements and ideologies on both sides of the political spectrum. 42 But then what 
separates left-wing populism from the right? If it is not their populist approach, then surely it 
must be related to party programs – the left generally understood to be progressive, the right 
conservative.  
Both sides seem to take different views of the same series of events – what may seem 
like a necessary update of moral values to left-wing protesters in the 60s can be depicted as 
godless atheism in the eyes of a conservative fighting for family values. Both will use 
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comparable rhetoric, discussed above, to achieve a wider support. Based on populist 
movements of the past, we can recognize different focal points on different sides of the 
spectrum. Conservative populists hammer on the importance of conserving the things “the 
people” value most, ranging from abstract terms as freedom and family values, to concrete 
things like employment and low taxes. Examples include the new right in the 1970s and 1980s43 
or today’s Tea Party. On the other hand, progressive populists stress the significance of 
advancement, defining progress according to their own values. Often this means focusing on 
decreasing income disparity and acknowledging people’s individuality. Examples include the 
new left in the 1960s and William Greider’s writing, on which the next chapter will focus.  
 Of course, this demarcation is not clear-cut. The People’s Party united elements from 
both progressive and conservative populism, calling for increased equality in order to secure 
their values from the plutocracy. Nonetheless, this distinction will prove useful to understand 
Greider’s position along the populist spectrum.  
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Chapter 2: The Federal Reserve 
A Journalist Examining a Regulatory Agency 
 
One capital example of Rosanvallon’s ‘regulatory agencies’ is the Federal Reserve  System. The 
United States’ central bank is the primary means by which the US government regulates its 
financial markets and, consequently, the national economy. Through various mechanisms, the 
Fed supervises America’s banks and their policies, in order to protect the US economy and its 
citizens from the volatility that accompanies a financial market without rules.  
 Whether the Fed is successful in achieving these goals is subject to heated debate. Ever 
since its creation in 1913, the Fed’s policy has met with fierce debate and opposition. Many 
authors and journalists of varying levels of repute have written thick books on the Federal 
Reserve, but this paper will focus on the work of William Greider. At the time a reporter for the 
Washington Post, Greider is interested in “the politics that is distant from the formal machinery 
of elections.” Specifically, he focuses on power relationships between “the people” and their 
government, on why it is so hard for “people who have no power” to “break through the snares 
and obstacles and somehow get the system to respond to their demands.”44 The Federal 
Reserve is only one of those snares, a small subset of the countless bureaucratic and political 
obstacles between citizens and their power. Chronologically, his investigations have concerned 
themselves with larger and larger subjects, and Secrets of the Temple is near the top of his 
bibliography. Published in 1987, it gives an insightful account of the history and purpose of the 
Fed, and is an essential part of a debate that still rages today.  
The 1980s saw the presidency of Ronald Reagan and the rule of his infamous “supply-
side economics”: the idea that increasing funds for the wealthy would yield economic benefits 
throughout the economy due to their increased production power. Written during the 
substantial economic decline of the 1980s that would mark the start of the savings and loan 
crisis, Greider’s account of the Fed shows that he was influenced by the work of his two most 
famous colleagues, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, famous for uncovering the Watergate 
scandal. His writing emerges simultaneously with and opposed to neoliberalism and its 
unwavering faith in the purported self-regulatory capabilities of economic freedom from 
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government intervention. Reading Greider's hefty work, the reader gets the impression that the 
writer is unraveling a plot, trying to succeed where is contemporaries failed: to explain exactly 
what the Fed does.45 Using interviews and meeting minutes as significant sources, Secrets of the 
Temple is an extensive piece of investigative journalism. In order to find out what happened to 
the people’s mandate, the main questions Greider sets out to answer are: what is the purpose 
of the Fed? What does the Fed do? And most importantly: who benefits from the Fed’s policy? 
 The Fed has frequently played a major role in conspiracy theories46 and any critique runs 
the risk of being derided as such. Populism is often associated with superstition and conspiracy 
theories. Rising from ignorance, conspiracies surround just about any wealthy person, family or 
company. Combined with Rosanvallon’s understanding of populism as a “pathological oversight” 
in search of “an other” to be opposed to, any populist critique is easily categorized as a paranoid 
phantasm. This is why a close examination of the populist critique issued by Greider is 
necessary. I wish to understand to what extent it is populist and to what extent we can benefit 
from this approach to recent history. Is it reasonable to understand the Fed’s interactions with 
Wall Street as a sign that there is a financial elite controlling US financial policy? Is Greider’s 
work a rebuttal of the stereotype that populists suffer from paranoid delusions? 
 In various ways, the Fed has a strong influence on the American financial markets, and 
hence the economy. Greider argues that the Fed’s policy is, at the very least, rather suspicious. 
It was founded to protect the population by regulating financial markets, but when one looks at 
the Fed’s actions, it seems like they often serve the banks rather than the US population. Such 
regulation was demanded by 19th-century Populists, but by the time the Federal Reserve Act 
was passed in 1913, it was also supported, and in fact written, by bankers. Greider highlights the 
close ties between the Wall Street bankers and the Fed governors, focusing on the benefits Wall 
Street has reaped from the Fed’s actions.  
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The Federal Reserve: A History of distrust 
As a regulatory agency, the Fed’s main purpose is to maintain a stable economic environment. 
We can understand the Fed as working similarly to a steam valve, regulating the pressure on an 
engine. If the pressure rises too high, the valve is opened. If the pressure drops too far, the valve 
is closed. The role of the Fed is to be a series of such valves, a straightforward set of mechanics 
in the intricacies of running a country, rather than a political instrument. To that end, Fed 
policies are to remain insusceptible to popular opinion. Fed board members, in charge of the 
daily operations and general policy, are appointed for terms of 14 years. This exempts the board 
from the whims of the people, for the same reason judges are not directly elected. This way, the 
board can theoretically set its own apolitical course in order to keep the US economy stable. 
Greider’s allegation is that the Federal Reserve is not apolitical at all. He claims that, if examined 
closely, the Fed turns out to serve a very select part of the US population: the wealthy, those 
who own others’ debts. Rather than regulating the banks of Wall Street, the Federal Reserve 
seems to aid them.  
 In this sense, it is suitable that Greider describes Andrew Jackson’s “crusade” against the 
Second Bank of the United States (SBUS). Like Jackson, Greider is suspicious of the national bank 
and its mechanisms, describing Jackson’s “question of whether a central bank was compatible 
with American ideals” as “a seminal conflict in American politics.” Jackson was one of the United 
States’ first populists, carrying rhetorical inconsistencies to reconcile opposites and thus please 
what he dubbed the “real people”.47 Understanding Jacksonian populism with regard to the 
SBUS will help us understand Greider’s populist perspective. It will also offer us a clear view of 
the mechanisms of the SBUS, the American economy and the Fed. 
 Since the US independence, money consisted of gold and silver coins, namely specie, 
and paper currency. Only the government was allowed to issue specie, which had a fixed 
international value. However, it was unwieldy for everyday use, and hard to come by in many 
situations, especially in the younger states in the west. Paper money was issued by private 
corporations: banks. Private meant that individuals owned the banks, and not the government. 
Investors (in theory, though not always in practice) contributed specie to the bank’s starting 
capital. Because the bank was incorporated, the investors risked no more liability than they had 
initially invested: the bank was a legal entity which bore that responsibility. Banks made a profit 
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by lending money, or rather by writing out paper money and promising to exchange it for specie 
if turned in at the bank. For the bank’s shareholders, it was tempting to write out more paper 
money than they had specie. That way, they could make a higher return on interest. The paper 
money would flood the local market, causing the economy to boom. At the same time, the large 
amount of money would cause inflation, meaning that money became worth less: the same 
items cost more dollars. As it became clear that the bank could not back up its paper currency, 
people would start to panic and try to exchange their notes for species. This depleted the specie 
reserves, rendering the notes worthless and the people broke. After an economic depression, 
the cycle would restart.  
 The SBUS was founded in 1816 in an effort to halt this cycle. It redeemed local banks’ 
notes, obtained through taxes. If the Eastern Kentucky Bank (EKB) issued a lot of notes in 1819, 
that meant a lot of people would pay their taxes with EKB paper money. The SBUS would then 
redeem these bills for specie at the EKB, limiting the amount of paper money it could produce. 
Both private investors and the American government owned the SBUS. The government owned 
20% of the Bank’s shares and appointed one-quarter of its directors; the rest was financed by 
private investors.48 
 Andrew Jackson opposed the SBUS on various grounds, most of which need not be  
explained here in depth. Most significant among them was the fact that the SBUS's private 
investors were supported with tax payers’ money. He argued the bank’s revenue should go “to 
the whole people, instead of a few monied capitalists who are trading upon our revenue.”49 The 
classic populist distinction between “the people” and “the other” is clear here, and Jackson 
convinced many people that the SBUS was unconstitutional. It used tax payer money to buy land 
in sovereign states (protected by the constitution), for which it did not have to pay taxes. In 
other words, Jackson saw the SBUS as a privately owned government institution. Because its 
charter was renewed once every 20 years, the congress that installed it imposed its authority on 
future generations. These were the grounds for Jackson’s campaign, arguing in favor of a 
national bank that “would have few officers, and no stockholders, make no loans, have no 
debtors, build no houses, rent no lands or houses, make no donations, and would be entirely 
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destitute of the influence which arises from the hopes, fears and avarice of thousands. It would 
oppress no man, and being part of the government, would always aid its operations.”50 Jackson's 
argument contains several elements of populist rhetoric. The distinction between “the people” 
and “the elite” of the world of finance rears its head once more, as well as the idea that rightful 
democratic power has been taken from “the people”. 
 In 1832, Jackson vetoed the extension of the SBUS' charter, which expired in 1836. As 
president, he used the veto to put his personal stamp on national policy, thus setting precedent 
for a much more invasive role for the presidential veto of his successors. Jackson’s veto 
increased liberties for corporations. These corporations proved to be a highly effective way to 
access the far-flung markets in the emerging western part of the United States. By deregulating 
the economy, or, in Jackson’s words, protecting the liberties of the “real people”, he 
empowered the big corporations. Jackson saw the government as an enemy of the 
constitutional rights of “the people”. During the second half of the 19th century, the government 
would be seen as the only way “the people” could protect themselves from the monied 
corporations.  
 
 
 
 
 Regulating Turbulent Financial Markets 
 
The Fed was designed in 1913 in response to the Panic of 1907. As we have seen above, the US 
economy proved unstable when not regulated, and the period after Jackson “killed” the SBUS 
was no exception. Economic crises occurred almost every decade, and the most shocking 
happened in 1907. A few investors tried to “corner the market” by buying all the shares of the 
United Copper Corporation, one of the biggest copper companies at the time. Unable to finance 
the entire operation, one of the investors’ banks failed, taking down the bigger Knickerbocker 
Trust with it. This triggered a major panic as people tried to withdraw their money from the 
banks where they had accounts. Most banks still lacked the funds to return all their clients ’ 
money, and eventually Wall Street and Washington had to join forces to restore confidence and 
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stability in the banking system. J.P. Morgan, the nation’s leading financier at the time, brokered 
a deal in which he persuaded the US Treasury and New York’s wealthiest bankers to invest 
almost $40 million to save the foundering financial system.51  
 The panic was the final straw that convinced even the bankers that financial reform was 
necessary.52 The People’s Party had already argued in favor of reform at the end of the 19th 
century, but now the idea was commonly accepted. In 1913, the Federal Reserve Act was signed 
into law.  
 The primary mechanism with which the Fed influences the market is the Discount 
Window. To understand its function, we must understand how banks make money, and how 
they make a profit. The process happens as follows: a businessman approaches a bank for a 
loan. The bank investigates whether his business plan is sound, and, if so, lends the necessary 
money. This money is written to the businessman’s account. That is to say that the man can use 
the money in his account to pay other people: he can make wire transfers or withdraw cash. 
Banks in turn make a profit in the form of interest over the money lent. The businessman pays a 
certain percentage of interest, thus adding money to the bank’s account. By lending money to 
customers, banks create money.  
The situation above is comparable to 19th-century banking, except for the Federal 
Reserve notes, the paper money issued by the Federal Reserve. Before the founding of the Fed, 
local banks issued their own money, which could be transferred for specie at one of their branch 
offices. For example, the EKB wrote out paper money that could be exchanged for specie at any 
of the Eastern Kentucky Bank branch offices. Instead of paper money issued by banks, banks’ 
debts to their customers now take the form of numbers in their accounts. Having an account 
with the Bank of America that has $1,000 “in” it means that the Bank of America promises to 
give the account holder up to $1,000 in Federal Reserve Notes.  
 Just as before, banks don’t need to have cash money to back up every single account, as 
long as there is no run on the banks. In other words, banking business is based on  promises and 
trust: as long as the people trust their banks to be good for their accounts, the system keeps on 
running. If a panic starts to brew, it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: the more people 
withdraw their money, the bigger the chance that the bank will run out of cash, which will 
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prompt more people to attempt to withdraw their money before it is gone. Like a cattle 
stampede, a bank panic is a positive feedback cycle: it reinforces itself. In 1907, banks and the 
government had to step in to halt the spiral. In 1913, bankers and politicians instituted a plan to 
prevent that from becoming necessary. The Fed’s primary function is to reassure the public that 
debts will be fulfilled.53 
  First, it keeps the expansion of credit in check, by way of the ‘reserve requirement’. This 
means that all banks must keep a certain percentage of their customers’ money in cash. As of 
2014, this percentage is between 0 and 10%.54 Theoretically, this prevents banks from 
overextending their credit, which would create too much money and lead to excessive inflation. 
If a bank still creates too much money, it will have to balance its reserves. This can be done by 
calling in the bank’s outstanding loaned money, or by borrowing money at the Discount 
Window. Money borrowed at the Discount Window is added to the bank’s account in one of the 
12 Federal Reserve Banks, removing its solvency problem. The public can rest assured that, due 
to the systems instated by the Fed, banks will remain solvent: the panic is prevented before it 
happens.  
 As we saw above, banks wrote out their own debt notes before the Fed was founded: 
the EKB wrote out EKB bank notes, the Western Tennessee Bank WTB bank notes. Today, all 
banks deal with dollars. In order to prevent a panic as mentioned above, the Discount Window is 
a solution for a bank’s liquidity problems. A bank can borrow money from the Federal Reserve at 
better rates than from its competitors.  
However, even if banks are not in trouble, they can use the Discount Window to acquire 
more money. This way, the Fed can influence the financial market. By setting the interest rates 
high, the Fed limits how profitable it will be for banks to turn to the discount window: high 
interest rates mean loans will have high rates, meaning they will be less attractive for individual 
borrowers. The banks will be able to sell fewer loans. Low interest rates mean that banks can 
offer cheap loans, attracting more people to their offices. More loans me an an increased 
amount of money in circulation, stimulating the economy by increasing the financial possibilities 
of consumers, investors and businesses.55 Similarly, if the Fed increases interest rates, the 
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economy will grow at a lower rate. This way, the Fed is able to loosen and squeeze the money 
supply, influencing the economy. The Fed board should, in the words of William Martin, 
chairman of the Fed from 1951 to 1970, “lean against the wind” so that economic growth will 
not spiral out of control.56 This keeps the economy nicely in check. However, what kind of 
growth of the economy is desirable?  
 
 
 
Greider and the Federal Reserve 
 
According to Greider, the Fed has always pushed its own agenda when answering this question. 
To understand why “leaning against the wind” is so important we need to examine who 
occupies the seats on the board of governors, and how they attain such power. The Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC), in charge of such influential decisions as setting the rent for 
the Discount Window, consists of two parts. On the one hand are five of the 12 presidents of the 
district Reserve Banks, scattered throughout the country. These presidents are appointed by the 
district’s board of directors, six out of nine of whom are appointed by commercial banks who 
are “member banks” of the Federal Reserve System.57 On the other hand are the seven 
governors of the Federal Reserve Board, appointed to 14fourteen-year terms by the President. 
 The district presidents are appointed by boards where a majority of the voters 
represents banking interests. So what how about the Presidential appointees? The Federal 
Reserve Act says the President “shall have due regard to a fair representation of the financial, 
agricultural, industrial and commercial interests and geographical divis ions of the country.”58 
However, according to Greider, “there were no farmers, manufacturers, small-business men or 
labor leaders on the board.” In fact, it seems that most Federal Reserve governors drift up from 
the financial world and, once they enter the bureaucratic pipelines that keep the daily Fed 
operations running, their priorities are quickly adjusted to the Fed standards. These priorities do 
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not always correspond with those of the people, or even the government. When one evaluates 
whether Fed policy is successful, the most highly valued judgment is found on Wall Street.59 
Because they make investments over the course of decades, bondholders are seen as 
the barometer of a country’s economic stability. If a country’s inflation is high, the bondholders’  
payments will be worth less when they eventually get their money back. Hence, bondholders 
are only willing to invest in a country they deem to be economically stable , i.e., one that has low 
inflation. For bondholders, this is an important indicator, as low inflation means that any capital 
retains most of its value. High inflation means all capital becomes proportionately less valuable. 
This also goes for debts, meaning that those that owe money see their debts decrease, and 
lenders see the value of outstanding debts decline as well. High inflation, in other words, is not 
favorable to creditors – at least in the short term.  
  Government bonds are a great example of capital begetting more capital. If one has 
enough money to buy government bonds and l ive without that money for the next thirty years, 
it can be a profitable endeavor. However, for the majority of the US population, this is not a 
possibility. The bondholders are a select yet very influential part of the US population, and their 
interests are often opposed to that of the general population. Economic good news can means 
an increase of funds in the money market, and thus higher inflation: bad news for bondholders. 
This is where Greider’s book identifies “the other”, “the elite”: the monied few, whose judgment 
determines the Fed’s operation: 
  
What was good for this affluent minority of citizens, of course, might or might not be 
good for the rest of the country, and, very often, the bondholders sought the opposite 
of what the majority wanted. […] Like all special-interest groups, of course, bondholders 
saw their own self-interest as synonymous with the national interest. Officials at the 
Federal Reserve listened closely. They monitored the daily prices and interest rates from 
the bond trading.60 
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So if the Fed does not seem to represent the interests of the US population, and hence, in 
principle, the government (as it is elected to represent the population), how does it stay on this 
independent course? 
 
 
  
 Smoke and Mirrors: Obscuring Information 
 
The exact mechanisms of who appoints members of the Fed are already rather confusing. The 
Fed’s communications with the outside world are not much better. Starting with the price 
collapse of 1920, the Fed developed a significant “skill”: the “ability to obfuscate and confuse 
when under attack.” Ever since it has become standard procedure to evade the heart of 
questions asked. By answering accurately in the narrow sense, the exact role the Fed plays in 
certain matters remains obscured.61 For example, in response to the recession of 1981, Fed 
Chairman Paul Volcker argued that the Fed had only increased the interest rates and that the 
problem was caused by high inflation. Naturally, this does not do you much good if you are 
facing foreclosure: the high inflation was manageable in itself, as long as the interest rates were 
accommodating to businesses’ needs. 
 However, if the Fed clearly announced its motivations for its actions, it would be a lot 
harder to succeed in its goals, namely to keep interest rates low, and economic growth stable 
and predictable: “Secrecy and evasion were considered necessary to the task.”62 The more 
remote it was from public scrutiny, the better: 
 
Citizens were taught that its activities were mechanical and nonpolitical, unaffected by 
the self-interested pressures of competing economic groups, and its pervasive influence 
over American life was largely ignored by the continuing political debate. Its decisions 
and internal disputes and the large consequences that flowed from them remained 
remote and indistinct, submerged beneath the visible politics of the nation. The details 
of its actions were presumed to be too esoteric for ordinary citizens to understand.63 
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The chasm between Fed policy makers and the US population is highlighted by the Fed’s rate 
hikes of the late 1970s. Where the FOMC saw a recession as a necessary evil, it meant great 
financial woe to millions of Americans. The members of the FOMC did not acknowledge the 
impact its decisions had on ordinary people’s lives. President Reagan felt that the sacrifices were 
necessary, and emphasized that he always backed the Federal Reserve. Anything went to halt 
the rampant inflation of the late 1970s.64 Even the Fed’s interactions with the rest of the 
government were marked by a comparable elitist disdain for non-bankers: 
 
The Federal Reserve embraced [the idea] that government must be removed from 
politics in order to produce good policy.[...The] reforms were intended, fundamentally, 
to protect government from the people.[…] [T]he Federal Reserve constantly must 
soothe and cajole Congress and the White House. This necessarily required artful 
manipulation and produced an uneven relationship that was often marked by disdain, 
even contempt. The technocrat who understands the facts must coax the ignorant 
politician into doing the “right thing.”65 
When appointed by President Jimmy Carter, Volcker made it clear he would set his own course, 
rather than catering towards the needs of the president. He would not have to account for his 
actions in the short term. To keep Fed policy impartial, so it can function as a cog in the 
bureaucratic machinery rather than as a political pawn, Fed governors are appointed for 14-year 
terms. The chairman is appointed for four-year terms. However, by protecting the Fed’s 
independency in this manner, any direct form of control by the executive branch is supposed to 
be ruled out. 
 The Fed’s elusiveness was further enhanced by its tendency to obscure as much of its 
policy as possible, especially when dealing with the general public. Ever since its inception, the 
Fed has dealt with criticism by way of elusive answers. By employing complicated technical 
answers, the Fed would be technically correct. At the same time, the answers would be 
purposefully formulated to dodge whatever point the questions made. When questioned about 
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the impact of raised interests on farmers, the Fed’s answer would be loaded with technical 
terms, inaccessible to financial laymen. This way, the Fed was able to defend almost any 
standpoint with equal conviction: from the right angle, any situation could have multiple 
explanations.66 The results of the Fed’s abstruse communication was that the general population 
felt disengaged, unable to comprehend the Fed’s policy and the mechanics behind money: “For 
the ordinary citizen […] it did sound like magic.”67 
 
 
 Understanding the Fed’s Operations in a Democracy 
Looking at the system of Fed governor appointments, at the Fed’s need to obscure its policy in 
order to be able to have it accepted, and at the bond market’s role as a barometer, we can 
easily understand why the Fed evokes such a high number of conspiracy theories. It now 
becomes clear that the Fed’s operations need thorough questioning, and that it is in the Fed’s 
interest to avoid giving direct answers to these questions as much as possible: if the veil of 
complex mystery is lifted, “the people” might catch on to the fact that their lives are influenced 
by the Fed’s operations, and that the Fed does not share their interests.  Greider’s case is 
compelling, and his most damning criticism is hidden in a footnote: 
Given its anomalous position in the constellation of political power, it is inconceivable 
that the Federal Reserve could ever speak freely and plainly to the general public. It 
would be overwhelmed with political complaints, for instance, if it announced in 
advance that it intended to induce a recession, and probably not even its influential 
supports in finance would be able to save it. Citizens would question the decision and 
the methods of liquidation. Eventually, they would ask why this momentous decision for 
the entire nation was delegated to an assembly of unelected technocrats, without even 
the requirement to consult Congress or the President.  
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Secrecy and evasion are integral to the Federal Reserve’s power and it, therefore, fails 
the minimum prerequisite for representative democracy – that the government must 
deal honestly with the citizens whom it governs. To resolve the dilemma, the powers of 
the central bank would have to be relocated elsewhere in the government where 
decisions could be examined in democratic forums and the decision makers held 
accountable in democratic elections.68 
Greider’s argument is that the Federal Reserve System is at its heart undemocratic. It represents 
the monied few rather than the people, and is placed outside the democratic system, because 
there is no need to account for the Fed’s policy. Because the information available to the people 
is scarce and often veiled behind the smokescreen that is economic jargon, they are not aware 
of the extent to which their “rightful primacy” has been robbed. Consequently, there is no 
political incentive to change the system, despite the fact that it does not serve the country’s 
population. Money derives its value from faith, faith that a piece of paper can be of value. 
Greider likens the faith in money to a religious faith, with the Fed as church. By obscuring itself 
from public scrutiny – by no longer keeping records of FOMC meetings, by speaking in highly 
technical jargon to the public, and by deciding without conferral what policy was best for the 
country – the Federal Reserve has taken on the role of a church.69 Secrets of the Temple is 
Greider’s attempt to blow away the fog of obscurity and enlighten the American people on how 
their country is run. Why is this necessary? How are “the people” kept out of the loop? 
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Chapter 3: A Degenerating Democracy  
Expanding the Populist Perspective 
 
In Who Will Tell the People, Greider further investigates the relations between American citizens 
and their government, focusing especially on the extent to which the country can be called a 
democracy. His book reads like a medical diagnosis. In principle, a healthy American democracy 
is one where citizens are able to use their power to vote to decide what happens to their 
country. However, it seems that reality has diverged from this starting point. Greider sets out to 
investigate what has happened, and tries to untangle the myriad causes of his country’s 
diseased state.  
He examines the developments leading up to the 1990s that have caused “citizens to 
lose faith in the idea that elections are the best means for making government accountable or 
advancing the public’s aspirations.”70 Along the way, he identifies a number of problems that 
have caused “citizens” to feel like they are no longer represented in government policy.  
This growing divide is thoroughly fleshed out in the book. First, Greider discusses 
misinformation: “ordinary citizens” are no longer involved in politics, because the information 
available to them is either hard to understand for laymen, or no longer focuses on the stuff that 
matters. Secondly, government policies do not deal with actual people’s problems. So much  so 
that many people wonder who the government is supposed to work for. This doubt is 
strengthened by the fact that corporations seem to be growing more powerful and more and 
more effective in swaying the government, while citizens see their position weaken.  
While Greider digs into these problems, I will use his investigation to illustrate the 
populist tendencies his writing and subject matter reveal. To keep my argument lucid, I will 
discuss Who Will Tell the People in relation to the various populist themes that permeate it. 
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Who are “the People”?  
 
Who Will Tell the People explores the alienation of the American population from their 
democracy. Greider’s argument makes a distinction between those people who are supposed to 
determine how the country is run, and those who do. The latter group consists of politicians at 
the national level, the press, and large corporations and the lawyers and lobbyists they hire. The 
first group consists of everybody else, whom he refers to mostly as “citizens,” and someti mes 
“the people” (as in the title).  
 In his introduction, he identifies one of the main problems with today’s power relations:  
 
If democracy has lost any accountability to the governed, it is because there is no longer 
any reliable linkage between citizens and those who hold power. If the people 
sometimes seem dumb in public affairs, it is because no institution takes responsibility 
for teaching them or for listening to them. 71 
 
Citizens are out of touch, and that is because education on the problems facing their country has 
become an economical commodity. If a certain interest group wants Senator A to take a certain 
answer, it is in their interest that Senator A’s constituency believes what the interest group 
wants them to believe. Citizens are influenced by rich and powerful entities, designed to serve 
lobbyists’ ends, rather than free debate.72 Citizens’ misinformation is intensified by the role of 
the press, discussed below.  
 Greider notes that not only are citizens misinformed, but they are also seeing their 
democratic input yield less and less result. The more they try, the more people notice that their 
vote will not influence national policy in their favor. They have the feeling that they no longer 
have the ability to change the shape of their country, as “[p]ublic-spirited reforms enacted in the 
last generation (including public hearings and formal access to decision making for ordinary 
people) have only deepened their skepticism. They can see for themselves that the democratic 
form is not the reality.”73 Greider observes that, in reaction to this discrepancy between theory 
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and reality, many citizens have resorted to grassroots initiatives that focus on one regional issue. 
However, these initiatives often operate outside the grid of legitimate politics.  
 Greider lumps a lot of different people together here, but unifies them in a single 
aspect: they no longer feel they are a part of the democratic process. As Canovan puts it, they 
have been robbed of their “rightful primacy” and they are steadily losing power to “the elite.” 74  
 
 
 
Pitching the “The People” Against “the Elite” 
 
If not the people, who is in charge? Greider refers to “the elite” throughout Who Will Tell the 
People. The term refers to those people who see their demands realized in national policy, and 
Greider investigates how they do it. Most significantly, he identifies politicians, the press and 
corporations as the three parties that determine the country’s course. Politicians, he notes, no 
longer primarily represent the US population. Rather, their policy is determined by the press and 
by large corporations: “Politicians respond as though public opinion is merely a transient 
romantic sentiment to be indulged.”75 
 The press, after all, is vital in determining which issues matter to the publi c. They decide 
which problems receive most of the public’s attention, which politicians are allowed to share 
their opinions, and so on. By determining the scope of a problem, they also limit the possible 
solutions to it: if a certain alternative is never discussed, how would the population be able to 
care about it? Along the same lines, Greider argues that the “media define ‘politics’ as the 
narrow subject of winning or losing elections – not deciding issues in government.” Due to a 
“closed loop between politicians and the reporters, […] the campaign coverage generally 
excludes public questions that people may care about – or ought to care about – unless the 
subject figures in the electoral strategies of the candidates.”76 As a consequence, many 
problems only surfaced after they had reached a critical state, such as the savings and loan 
crisis.77 Similarly, these same elections are nowadays focused much less on pressing issues than 
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on “the character and celebrity of the candidates”: elections have become a popu larity contest, 
much less an exercise in democratic power.78 
 In other words, Greider argues that the public is no longer well -informed on the issues 
that matter. They are losing their overview of matters that influence their daily lives, and it is 
due to the way press and politics intertwine. Greider goes on to argue why the press has 
become alienated from its role as educator of the people, and it is because news is business. 
Being progressive is dangerous to potential investors, whereas a reliable, safe and unsurprising 
modus operandi will attract more confidence.79 For journalists, it is also beneficial to be near the 
source of the news. However, this means bonding with the policy makers who determine 
current events. This has resulted in further alienation of the people from the press: 
 
The press has lost viable connections to its own readers and grown more distant from 
them. Because of this, it speaks less reliably on their behalf. As an institution, the media 
have gravitated toward elite interests and converged with those powerful few who 
already dominate politics. People sense this about the news, even if they are unable to 
describe how it happened or why they feel so alienated from the newspapers that 
purport to speak for them.80 
 
Since World War II, corporations have started using their economic power to acquire political 
power. Greider points out multiple ways in which monied corporations have been able to bend 
or change the law in their favor, and all of them are possible because economics have taken 
over Washington. If it is cheaper for corporations to break laws and pay the fines, then they will 
do so. If spending millions of dollars on lobbyists to pressure and manipulate elected politicians 
to align themselves with a company’s interest, such as subsidizing a factory in the 
congressman’s district, then they will do so. Corporations see Washington politics as a 
marketplace, a place where deals can be made.81 Greider’s examples are myriad and convincing: 
a telling example is the Clean Air Act of 1970, which has been overhauled and adjusted under 
heavy lobbying influence. The Environmental Protection Agency is still unable to fine hundreds 
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of old, polluting, power plants due to different exceptions that benefit energy corporations. 82 
His argument, though he does not formulate it as explicitly, is that the laws of supply and 
demand have superseded the laws of democratic government. This is problematic, because in 
some cases, mainly for large companies, it can be more profitable to subvert the democratic 
process than to adhere to it. What is even more, and though Greider does not address this 
argument as such it still plays a major role, Reagan even “institutionalized the use of cost -
benefit analysis”83 in establishing government policy. 
 Following his argument, the problem is two-pronged: on the one hand, people see they 
are losing power to a self-perpetuating elite. On the other hand, this causes them to lose faith 
and interest in the democratic process, thus weakening their own position. Once corporations 
have a foot in the legislative door, they will only expand their power if conditions are left 
unchanged. At the same time, Greider describes how “the citizens” are retreating from the 
democratic sphere, explaining how they feel both their political choices are bogus. Both the 
Democratic and the Republican party have “lost the capacity to serve as authentic connective 
tissue between government and citizens. In different ways, the major political parties and the 
news media have instead gravitated toward another source of power – the elite interests that 
dominate government.”84  
 Greider explicitly identifies elite interests at the foundation of national policy, opposing 
them with the priorities of the people. It is not hard to recognize the populist tendencies that 
power his argument. The people, he argues, are neglected by those they have put into power. 
They can see their rightful democratic power wane under the influence of increasingly powerful 
monied forces.  
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Conspiratorial? 
 
At first glance, both Who Will Tell the People and Secrets of the Temple seem to border on a tale 
of conspiracy. In the former, Greider exposes the connections between politicians, press and 
corporations and the way they systematically exclude citizens from the rul ing of their own 
country. By emphasizing the distinction between “citizens” and “the elite” repeatedly, Greider 
draws an invitingly simple black-and-white picture of the complex relations that have led to the 
public’s disenchantment with national politics, due their decreasing influence. As Paul Taggart 
notes, this is a staple element of populist theories.85 Conspiracies speak to the imagination of 
the people, as it is always easier to have a single scapegoat to blame for one’s problems than to 
have to address a large number of small causes. Greider even goes so far as to state that “the 
governing elites and monied interests” have created “a series of elaborate screens […] that 
distracts the public from the real content and gives politicians a place to hide. […] In public, the 
two major parties struggle contentiously over tax issues. Yet the reality is the collaborations 
between them.”86 
 However, there is merit to his approach, as “the people” are not hapless victims, by his 
account. Due to the changing priorities of the press, they were left unaware of the changing 
political environment they inhabited. But to Greider, they are not left impotent. In fact, unlike 
populist politicians who call for people to vote for them, Greider argues that it is the people who 
can take back their power themselves. They must find a way to incorporate their local initiatives, 
which are often successful, into a more national political theater: 
 
It is not far-fetched, for instance, to imagine that a decade hence a broad alliance of 
citizen-based political organizations may have formed that can effectively exercise the 
power of “organized people” once again in elections.87 
 
Greider still believes in the possibility or rehabilitating the American democracy. He emphasizes 
the role of the United States at the start of the democratization of the Western world. Although 
in that sense nationalistic, he simultaneously emphasizes the need for Americans to understand 
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that they live in a country which exists on a global scale. Where others first followed the 
“American beacon” in the 19th and early 20th century, Greider suggests that perhaps now “the 
former students” can “re-educate Americans in the meaning of their own faith.” Still, Greider 
believes that the United States will be able to “lead the world to ground where no one has ever 
been before.”88 Though critical, Greider’s judgment is clearly nationalistic, and portrays the 
United States as the rightful leader of the Western world, as long its people learn to place their 
problems in a global perspective. Corporations are multinational, and the products people buy 
and sell are shipped all across the globe.  
 
 
 
 Haggling over Legislature  
 
Greider uses corporations’ influence over national government as an example of how “the 
people” are losing control over the way their country is run. He illustrates the weight companies 
bear in the US political system with countless examples, perhaps most notably with an entire 
chapter on General Electric. He describes the impressive investments GE has made to inf luence 
the political arena, including their funding of political campaigns both Democrat and Republican, 
the vast team of lobbyists. Their self-portrayal as “good citizens” has led to considerable 
mismanagement from the American legal system: 
 
Corporations, however, enjoy an anomalous status not available to anyone else: In the 
lawless government, corporate “citizens” are the leading outlaws. They may regularly 
violate the law without surrendering their political rights -- committing felonious acts 
that would send people to prison and strip them of their citizenship. This contradiction is 
crucial to what has deformed democracy; the power relationships of politics cannot be 
brought into a more equitable balance until citizens confront the privileged legal status 
accorded to these political organizations.89 
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How has this become the norm? Greider extensively describes how politicians are influenced in 
the laws they pass by lobbyists and big-time financiers. But perhaps an even more telling 
devaluation of the American legal system is what happens after laws are passed: who enforces 
these laws? In order to make sure the democratic decisions are brought into practice, 
governments establish regulatory agencies. These agencies are responsible for making sure laws 
passed are enforced, regardless of whichever party is in office at that time. Like Rosanvallon, 
many political thinkers stress the importance of these agencies in the legitimization of a 
democratic government. Important examples include the Federal Reserve and the Environment 
Protection Agency.  
 However, Greider questions the extent to which these agencies are capable of standing 
up against the pressure brought on by corporations. He illustrates this with the Clean Air Act, 
passed in 1970 to make sure citizens would not have to live in excessively unhealthy conditions. 
However, by 1990, most polluters carried on – in full knowledge of the EPA. How was the law 
defused? Not just by spectacular bribes or shady blackmailing, which, according to Haynes 
Johnson, occurred regularly even at the highest echelons,90 but by haggling, in open view. 
Greider explains this with a powerful metaphor: the grand bazaar. He describes Washington as a 
city of decayed pride, where the old icons and buildings that symbolized lofty ideals  of the 
Enlightenment are no longer applicable. Rather, Washington would be more accurate if it were a 
grand bazaar, “a steamy marketplace of tents, stalls and noisy peddlers. The din of buying and 
selling drowns out patriotic music.”91 
 Corporations have learned to haggle, to use lawyers and lobbyists to renegotiate laws 
on their own terms. By making it nigh impossible to enforce laws, corporations can make it too 
expensive for regulatory agencies to enforce the laws. In other cases, paying the fine to break a 
law is cheaper than adjusting the production process to adhere to it.  If a law is challenged by a 
corporation, the litigation can postpone the legal consequences – buying time and thus profits 
for the company in question. This is “real political power.” Companies have a choice “whether to 
honor a law or resist it.”92 The methods are endless, and all of them subvert the regulatory 
agencies’ power. This, in turn, has an impact on the government’s legitimacy: regulatory 
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agencies ensure that a government can enforce the people’s will – if they do not do so, the 
government is apparently unable to represent its people.  
 Simultaneously, Reagan was running on a party program that focused on tax cuts and 
small government, which led him to privatize as much of the American government as possible 
in order to pay for the tax cuts.93 The budget cuts ran deep, and Reagan’s appointees were 
selected specifically to move government operations away from public to private interests.94 
These cuts and deregulatory actions not only greatly hindered long-term investments in 
infrastructure and human capital,95 but also further crippled social welfare programs as well as 
the US regulatory agencies. 
As described by Rosanvallon, regulatory agencies are a favored target for populists. This 
is why he argues that populists engage in “anti-politics”: populists are attacking the legitimating 
foundations of democracy. In contrast, Greider uses these agencies as a powerful example to 
demonstrate how the US government is weakening, and he explains how this has come to be. 
This is central in his argument in Who Will Tell the People. Regulatory agencies are indeed a 
target for Greider, but they are a symptom of a bigger problem.  
The American problem, to Greider, is that the American people are not aware of the 
way their democratic power is being manipulated. Their demands have become no more than a 
cog in the complex “supply and demand” or “cost and benefit puzzle” worldview adopted by 
corporations. This way, power circulates among the same elite generation after generation, by 
usurping the democratic power invested in politicians. Politicians who, under Reagan’s 
presidency, have become part of a government itself governed by cost-benefit analyses. How 
does this affect the people?  
Due to the priorities of the press, which are equally steered by supply and demand, the 
public remains uninformed of what this means for the direction in which their country is 
headed.  
From his background as a journalist, Greider has a clear view on how the priorities of the 
press have changed over the years. Here he conforms to Canovan’s assessment that “populism 
challenges not only established power-holders but also elite values”, by directing his “populist 
animus […] not just at the political and economic establishments but also at the opinion-formers 
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in […] the media.”96 Greider describes the Washington Post’s shift from “an impish, occasionally 
reckless disregard for the political establishment and its expectation” to a “responsible” 
newspaper, whose “reporters routinely defer to authority by accepting the official versions of 
what is true instead of always making trouble.” Due to the Post’s eventual monopoly, it no 
longer felt “the need for aggressiveness” and instead preferred to focus “on agreeability”.97 
Greider presents the Post’s development as typical for the news industry: conservative 
agreeability is predictable, stable and secure. It can survive a tough economic environment. 
Being wrong can cost the paper substantially, in credibility, turnover and circulation, and thus 
one can distinguish oneself by being the first with a good story. This has resulte d in journalists’ 
getting closer and closer with the sources of news: politicians. However, being too close to a 
subject can lead to myopia. He contrasts this with his early days working for the Cincinnati Post, 
where journalists were closer to the people working the printing press than the politicians that 
they wrote about. Greider argues that many journalists have lost their critical edge in order to 
guarantee a secure and quick delivery. This, in turn, has resulted in “the people” receiving the 
standard official story, not the hotly contended one. And if the public does not know about the 
problems, it cannot become outraged about them.  
Who Will Tell the People sheds light on what is wrong with the American democracy. It is 
an attempt to illustrate the country’s national political problems, to explain its illness. Greider’s 
solution depends on the people to reinvest themselves in civil initiatives. This way, he hopes 
they can eventually exert enough pressure on the nation’s politicians to once again take their 
priorities to heart, which would mean curtailing the power and influence of major corporations. 
In this sense, Greider’s standpoint hangs considerably to the left of the laissez-faire attitude 
adopted by rightwing politicians. To reach a sustainable future, the American people must 
reinvent their ability to inform themselves, and to govern themselves: “The first step toward 
renewal is to free ourselves of the cynical expectations of these times and to reassert that faith 
without hesitation or apology.”98 Only then is it possible to install a strong government, 
supported by a well-informed, vocal population, to limit the influence of the current elite. 
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Chapter 4: Greider’s populism and its critical reception 
 Identifying Populist Themes in Greider’s Work 
 
In a landscape where the literature is dominated by either dense standard works, purposefully 
complex legal articles or extremely conspiratorial fantasies, Secrets of the Temple provides 
accessible insight into the influence of the central bank on Americans’ daily lives. Without 
narrative, a book with an equally ambitious objective would fall prey to becoming a list of dry 
facts. Greider’s approach allows the reader to access all the information he has gathered in an 
understandable manner. In trying to explain how the Fed has come under control of the 
institutions and people it is supposed to regulate, Greider takes the reader by the hand through 
a maze of facts, anecdotes and citations.  
 
 
 
- Conspiratorial Populism 
 
This chapter will examine the critical responses to Greider’s work, and use these reviews to 
explore the populist elements that make his writing controversial. His narrative has met with 
considerable criticism, although, according to Dodd’s Review of the Reviews, “denial and 
misrepresentation are the common tools of Greider’s critics.”99 The most plain example is 
Financial Times’ reviewer Harris, who claims that Secrets is “a structure of the purest populist 
nonsense and mischievous at that,” because it wrongfully accuses “the Fed of deliberate 
deception.” Harris’s counterarguments add up to little more than that the “Fed was trying to 
learn on the job.”100 However, his criticism that Greider’s writing is defamatory towards the Fed 
is a common one. Minsky, for example, claims: 
 
In asserting that the Federal Reserve runs the country, Greider is accepting, unwittingly I 
am sure, the fundamental tenet of economic orthodoxy: the market mechanism seeks 
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out and sustains an equilibrium that can be considered an optimum – a best. In the 
strong form the doctrine becomes: government intervention can only be mischievous.101 
 
This reaction is one of many straw man fallacies encountered among reviews, as Greider in fact 
ends his book with a strong argument supporting a more direct political control of the Federal 
Reserve. In other words, he does not seem to think an optimal economic situation can ever be 
reached without a consistent modicum of interference by the government, as suggested by 
Wagner, who states that “Greider’s hostility toward the Fed arises because he thinks the Fed is 
anti-democratic, not because he is less than completely in favor of central banking per se.”102  
Minsky acts out against the populist tendency, identified by Niggle as “a conspiratoria l 
tone”103 throughout Secrets of the Temple, which Minsky says “is iconoclastic. [I]mplicit 
conspiracies are suggested, but the evidence is anecdotal. […] This reader feels that Greider set 
out to prove a conspiracy but he couldn’t marshal the evidence.”104 Minsky reproaches Greider 
for suggesting the Federal Reserve is run with a lot more secretive and organized intentions than 
is in fact the case. 
 This complaint is echoed by numerous reviewers who also happen to disagree with 
Greider’s substantive content. For example, Fand argues that “Greider insists on fitting all of this 
facts [sic] into his simplistic and conspiratorial framework, which views the Fed as primarily 
concerned with protecting bond holders and ‘Wall Street,’ he necessarily fails to see the real 
story.[…] Greider’s ‘analysis’ of the 1979 directive necessarily produces a definite distortion, 
perhaps even a ‘conspiratorial interpretation,’ of Fed actions.” Instead, Fand suggests that the 
dichotomy between “Main Street” and “Wall Street” is far too simple: just because the central 
bank does not work for Main Street, does not necessarily mean that it works for Wall Street. 
Fand argues that “the truth is that the Fed is serving neither Wall Street nor Main Street,” and 
what “Greider fails to see is that the more the Fed produces instability in the economy, or 
alternatively, the more it allows instability in the economy to develop, the more power the Fed 
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will get to make sure that such disorders do not occur.” Fand thinks that Greider’s overly simple 
narrative “fails to tell the truly amazing story of how the Fed manages to amass extraordinary 
power and prestige in light of its mediocre and poor performance; how it manages to mollify the 
public; how it avoids scrutiny and accountability; and how it gained power and influence.”105 It is 
interesting that Fand thus discards Greider’s narrative, but still supports the facts that carry it:  
 
Greider is a very good reporter who uncovers many interesting and important facts, but 
he forces these facts into a leftist, unsophisticated, simplistic, simple-minded, and 
perhaps Marxist, framework. He insists on seeing the Fed as the agent and protector of 
Wall Street, and he writes as if Wall Street had a single point of view which the Fed is 
implementing.106 
 
His own narrative, in which he would rather see the facts presented, suggests that the central 
bank is its own goal. As with all matters political, both sides can be supported by the same facts. 
However, it does not seem there is a substantive contradiction between both lines of argument: 
the Federal Reserve and Wall Street can both benefit if the Fed moves away from the political 
influence of Washington, which is in fact what Greider argues. After all, he too states that the 
Fed is too interested in its own survival.107 In general, the national government defends the 
rights of its people, and in this case, more specifically, from the uncertainty that is the 
consequence of an unregulated financial market. This is also the end to which the Fed was 
founded. By keeping this immense regulatory power in Washington, the government can secure 
its influence over Wall Street. The more this power becomes autocratic, the less influence 
Washington will have on the big banks, regardless of whether the Fed is under direct influence 
from Wall Street.  
Although conspiracies are a frequently returning element of populist rhetoric, Taggart 
identifies a significant element which proves crucial when describing Greider as conspiratorial. 
According to Taggart, political theories can identify a number of “elite groups such as bankers, 
politicians, intellectuals and captains of industry” and the way they work together without being 
conspiratorial. The difference is whether the theory describes “deliberative actions of a small set 
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of individuals,” or argues that “the system of rule is systematic and institutional.”108 Greider 
argues that America suffers from a systematic fault that has become increasingly worse, rather 
than from having specific conspirators in office. 
Add to that the numerous connections between the Board of Governors and the banks of 
Wall Street, and the mighty sway of the nation’s banks in the appointment of regional governors 
for the Federal Reserve, and Greider’s case becomes clear. Secrets is hailed by many reviewers 
as scary yet accurate, described by Kuttner as a “good humored yet deadly earnest populist 
manifesto.”109 Greider illustrates the great extent to which the Fed’s staggering independence is 
in stark contrast to the institution’s supposed original purpose, namely protecting “the people” 
by regulating the financial market.  
 
 
 
- The Minority Oppressing the Majority 
 
In both Secrets of the Temple and Who Will Tell the People, Greider identifies a potent entity 
which is robbing “the people” of its rightful democratic power. Though common in populist 
rhetoric, Greider’s case is a strong one. Fand feels Greider’s writing is overly polarizing, claiming 
he is “inclined to see any vote to tighten credit as a brazen disregard for human suff ering. 
Alternatively, any FOMC member who consistently votes for inflationary policies, appears, in 
Greider’s view, to be protecting the interest of the farmers, workers, borrowers and the 
unemployed.”110 As we saw above, Fand argues that Greider misses the point because he sticks 
to an overly simplistic narrative in which everybody is either with the people or against the 
people. Black and white representation of nuanced situations can be a powerful form of 
argument. Then again, as we shall see, Greider’s purpose is not just to inform, it is also to 
motivate. The question that determines the undertone of Secrets is one that concerns people’s 
lives: Why is the central bank not acting on behalf of the American people? Among the 
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reviewers, some deny it; others have failed to notice its central importance to Greider’s 
arguments. Some, like Dickens, confirm it: 
 
Greider investigates why money has been depoliticized. Why have the people 
acquiesced to/supported something that is detrimental to their own best interests? Why 
is monetary policy depoliticized, but fiscal policy very much politicized? Because the first 
is run by a supposedly apolitical technocratic organization. By placing the Fed under 
government control, the United States can repoliticize monetary policy.111 
 
By subtly disappearing from the political arena, the Federal Reserve has immunized itself from 
political debate and control. Although supposedly a regulatory instrument which legitimizes a 
democratic government, it no longer functions as an instrument. A drill should not choose which 
screws to turn. In response to Who Will Tell the People, critics appreciate this stern description 
of the current situation in American politics: 
 
We can only hope William Greider is wrong. He uses words such as betrayal and decay, 
then makes a strong case that they describe what we have done to our democracy. 
There is no shortage of evidence. Greider finds perverted and deformed democracy in 
public and hidden channels. He details the transgression -- from the bipartisan 
cooperation that protects elite groups to the system that allows huge companies to 
ignore certain laws and regulations.112 
 
Many reviewers support Greider’s somber diagnosis of American politics, agreeing that 
democratic power has been removed from the hands of “the people:” “Democracy has not 
protected the majority […] because it has not worked on the floor of Congress or at the ballot 
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box, where big campaign contributors are king.”113 Greider’s dichotomy between the majority 
and the minority is nonetheless a staple populist argument, as argued by Panizza:  
 
Allegations of corruption, malpractice or, more generally, the control of public life by a 
non-accountable and self-serving political elite are typical of the situation in which 
populism takes the form of the “politics of anti-polities”, as politicians and political 
parties become the “other” of the people.114 
 
Despite this populist label, Greider’s distinction between us and them, “the people” and “the 
elite”, the voters and the politicians, strikes a nerve with a majority of reviewers. They recognize 
its validity and follow the search to answer Greider’s question: How did this come to be? – 
 
 
 
- Dreaming of a Perfect Democracy 
 
According to Wagner, Greider’s view of “the people” stems from a “populist vision of unl imited 
democracy,” which Wagner argues Greider interprets as “the ‘will of the majority.’ Whether 
such a will can be defined; why it is good to adhere to it, and whether it entails tyrannical 
elements are issues about which Secrets is silent.”115 Wagner touches on a staple populist 
element in Greider’s work, namely identifying “the people” as a single entity with a clearly 
defined goal and best interest. By using “the people,” Greider can legitimize his demands by the 
implicit assumption that he represents the entire population, and that it need only be mobilized 
in order to overwhelm the forces that suppress it.116 The reviewer then suggests that Greider 
sees bondholders, or creditors more generally, as the interest group predominantly served by 
the Fed. According to Wagner, Greider uses this assumption to build an argument around the 
conflict between debtors and creditors, whereas Wagner argues that these two groups have a 
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common interest, namely contractual relationships that will benefit both parties in the l ong 
run.117 This would sweep the feet from under Greider’s argument that there is a minority 
suppressing the majority. However, the theoretically equal benefits of contractual relationships 
to both sides of the contract supposed here are at best debatable. A lthough both parties want 
to see all debts resolved, it is also always more advantageous for creditors to keep debtors in 
debt, as debt yields interest and thus profit. On the other hand, it is in a debtor’s best interest 
not to be in debt. In other words, when examined more closely, it seems that creditors and 
debtors have different, if not opposed, interests. 
This does not alleviate Greider’s use of “the people” from all reproach, because 
“[d]emocracy as the will of the people is a very theoretic and unre alistic target which bears no 
resemblance to the ‘real’ world.” Wagner further expounds on the problems of a representative 
democracy, and whether a majority will is, supposing it could be identified, something 
desirable.118  
 
Greider’s idealistic view of what constitutes a “real” democracy is also at the center of Who Will 
Tell the People, and it is no surprise that this view is a recurrent theme among critics:  
 
This book completes the author’s long journey from old-fashioned newsroom skeptic to 
thoroughgoing ideologue of the populist left. Ours is a government, Greider has finally 
concluded, that understands exactly what it is doing. It is a government deliberately and 
systematically conducted by and for the privileged interests of the society, and at the 
expense of everyone else.119 
 
Ehrenhalt reproaches Greider for sticking to a vague description, rather than a detailed account, 
of whose hardships exactly he is describing: “Only ‘the people’ are deceived. Just who qualifies 
for inclusion among ‘the people’ is never precisely clear.” Pitching a minority against the vague, 
undefined “the people” shows that “[Greider] has gradually evolved into a hardened populist, 
insisting that the failures of government have less to do with fool ishness than with overt 
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manipulation and greed.”120 Citing the multitude of occasions during which Greider refers to the 
US government breaking down, Ehrenhalt argues that Greider is referring to an ideal that never 
existed: he thinks “the burden of proof is on Greider to tell us what American democracy was 
like before it broke down.” Ehrenhalt is more skeptical than Greider, whose book is optimistic 
despite the weight of its message, and doubts whether a more “perfect” democracy has ever 
existed on American soil.  
 Next to doubting the presupposed unity of “the people,” Ehrenhalt takes his argument 
one step further: “On one crucial point, however, [Greider] has much in common with other 
critics of American politics, right as well as left. However he happens to be defining ‘the people’ 
at any given moment, he holds them essentially blameless for the predicament they are in.”  121 
His critique is that “Greider speaks of ‘the people’ as some sort of Platonic ideal, but in reality 
they—we—do not deserve to be let off the hook that easily. Often ‘the people’ get precisely the 
government they voted for.” Ehrenhalt’s point is that the people still determine what kind of 
lawmakers end up in office. It is still “the people” voting at the elections, no matter how flawed 
the rest of the country’s information infrastructure. However, Greider’s point is that 
circumstance and human mismanagement have left people no choice. This will be discussed 
further below.  
 Popkin also takes offense to Greider’s idealistic understanding of  American democracy, 
debasing his argument on the grounds of it being populist: 
  
To restore genuine democracy, Greider believes, we must begin with honest 
conversation. Honest conversation, in turn, will lead to self -realization and a politics 
grounded in intimate human terms. This is populism in a hot tub.122 
 
He diagnoses this approach as problematic, as Greider calls for a coherent economic political 
program from the Democratic Party, but “doesn’t even begin to suggest just what a coherent 
economic program is, or how to reconcile the interests of minorities, unions and 
environmentalists.” From a populist perspective this ailment is understandable or even 
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necessary, as different parts of the large group that is called “the people” are often diametrically 
opposed. However, this does not mean that Greider’s criticism is unjustified. In no way does it 
follow that having a wide range of constituencies should cause the Democratic Party to have an 
incoherent economic program. Similarly, Popkin’s criticism that “Greider also gives no serious 
attention to the many attempts from the left and right to reorder the regulatory system” would 
benefit from a little closer consideration. He does devote several chapters to exactly these 
attempts and why they fail. One of the main points in his book is about these attempts not 
taking off because they are thwarted by big corporations, thus, by losing the public’s trust in the 
long term, paralyzing the entire political process. According to Henderson, he is doing his 
readers a great service, raising “questions that every American who retains a faith in the self -
correcting capacities of democracy (and Greider is firmly among them) ought to confront. Take, 
for instance, his central theme that powerful ‘elites’ -- those capable of making huge financial 
contributions to today's money-run politics -- are shaping the public agenda and even the laws 
themselves.”123 
 When Greider says: “In different ways, the public keeps saying it is serious. But 
politicians respond as though public opinion is merely a transient romantic sentiment to be 
indulged,”124 he is right on the money. He is describing real situations that allow real populism to 
rise. This is identified as a recurrent theme amongst populists by Mouffe, who writes:  
 
[U]nder the banner of ‘modernisation’, social-democratic parties have in most countries 
identified themselves more or less exclusively with the middle classes, and that they 
have stopped representing the interests of the popular sectors – whose demands are 
considered “archaic” or “retrograde” -- we should not be surprised by the growing 
alienation of an increasing number of groups who feel excluded from the effective 
exercise of citizenship by the “enlightened” elites.125 
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- Who Will Educate the People? 
 
Perhaps the most redeemable populist staple, education is a crucial part of Greider’s work. 
Turner identifies the high value Greider places upon it: 
 
What is odd about the book is its title, since it is essentially a populist work. “No one in 
authority” can be relied on to tell the people the truth, Greider writes, because their 
interests are selfish and undemocratic. His central point is that ordinary people must 
produce answers themselves, and may. 
 
“The people,” or “ordinary people,” have been robbed of their rightful primacy, and it is up to 
them to restore it. How this can be done brings up one of the most interesting questions 
regarding Greider’s populist project: who can educate the people? According to Turner, Greider 
claims the people must educate themselves, because the press have failed to do so. However, it 
seems that Greider himself is educating “the people” on their predicament and his proposed 
solutions. This view is shared by many reviewers, who laud his books for their lucidity. Palmeri 
praises Who Will Tell the People for its “‘insider’s’ view of the problem that nicely complements 
the more theoretical analyses appearing in academic journals. Unlike most Washington-based 
journalists, Greider argues for a socially responsible press.” In fact, Palmeri hopes the book will 
spark discussion on the best way to discuss these complex political matters:  
 
Who Will Tell the People ought to provoke those of us in academia to consider how we 
contribute to the problems discussed. As part of the intellectual class, we are in the best 
position to “tell the people.” We have access to information that the average citizen has 
neither the time nor resources to obtain.126 
 
By steering clear of a more severe theoretical analysis, Greider’s book is able to convey its point 
with more power. Rather than losing itself in complex frameworks, it creates an accessible 
account of the reader’s current situation, as well as a proposed course of action. Rather than by 
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social scientists, “some of the most perceptive books on American politics these days are by 
journalists […] who understand the details and, to our benefit, how they fit together.”127 This is 
also why Secrets of the Temple is acclaimed for its demystification of money matters in 
combination with its lucid description of the purposeful discombobulation put forth by the 
Fed.128  
 By approaching the paralysis of American politics with populist tools, Greider is able to 
dismantle the problem in a new way, offering new insights: 
 
The power of Who Will Tell the People is that Greider brilliantly links these processes 
within the “grand bazaar” of Beltway politics to reveal how they have collectively 
transformed the very meaning of American politics by effectively draining the vitality -- 
“the messy center of democratic dialogue”-- out of national life. This sets the book apart 
from the literature that assumes that the dialogue still somehow continues.129 
 
Goodwyn praises Greider for his new approach, which is founded rather on a populist doctor’s 
diagnosis than on a neutral scientist’s hypothesis. His faith in the theoretic justness of the 
American democracy motivates him to find out why it is apparently unsuccessful in practice. His 
conclusion, that Americans no longer believe in their system of government because it has not 
fulfilled its promise of granting their demands, is one of a fervent believer: it removes the blame 
from the people. Ehrenhalt feels that this is naively incorrect: 
 
It is simply not credible that a generation of politicians bred and trained for reelection 
could get themselves and the country into so much trouble by failing to notice what the 
voters wanted. They have exquisite machinery for determining that, and they use it. 
What is credible is that they blundered by giving us exactly what we wanted, and don't 
know how to stop. We have a right to blame them for that, but we have no reason to 
excuse ourselves in the process.130 
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Ehrenhalt admits that American democracy no longer works as it ought to. However, this is due 
to the people’s votes. Like a feedback system, American politicians have adjusted themselves to 
the demands for election. The public decides who is elected, and thus what kind of tactics are 
successful in the election process. Ehrenhalt thus reproaches the American people for voting 
superficially, and argues that Greider is too soft on the people: “Greider finally meets, perhaps 
for the first time, a piece of conventional wisdom that he likes: the people are, if sometimes 
misguided, ultimately virtuous, and they want only the best.”131 Greider’s populism prevents 
him from shifting blame to “the people” and questioning their infallibility. Ehrenhalt counters 
that, by voting (or not voting), “the people” can set the demands on who wins, and who loses. 
As politicians want to be elected, they will adapt their strategies to be successful as much as 
possible. Over time, this leads to whatever works for candidates to make it into office. If this 
includes making deals with lobbyists who have strong influence with interest groups in their 
district, so be it – even if this is not in the best interest of the people. If it works better to scorn 
faults in your opponent’s character than to elaborate on your environmental policy, then 
candidates will do so. Eventually, these kinds of issues will become central to elections.  
 Of course, this is Greider’s point: he derides the press for focusing on insignificant 
points, on stories that are not substantive. Ehrenhalt engages in a chicken-or-egg debate over 
who failed first: “the people” or the politicians. Greider’s argument goes beyond that, because 
his case is that regardless of how this came to be, the current state of affairs is not conducive to 
running any “real” democracy: it is shallow and superficial, and can only lead people away from 
the matters that determine their lives, causing them no longer to vote in their own best 
interests: 
 
The aim of the new politics in America is to induce people to vote their resentments. 
The press fully participates, revealing private “scandals” to convince itself that it is 
engaged in genuine reporting, even as it avoids the deeper issues of social 
governance.132 
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Greider calls for a rehabilitation of the press, regardless of ‘who started it.” If “the people” are 
ever to restore their faith in American democracy, they must discover that politics can work to 
make their demands reality. In order for that to happen, they must first know what is going on in 
their country, and who decides the shape of their daily lives. Of course, this yiel ds a practical 
question: how can the press afford to do so? The reason they report on “scandals” rather than 
genuine reporting is that scandals, juicy gossip and the devaluation of powerful people sell. 
News is a business enterprise, and without profit, companies do not survive. Just as in national 
politics, economic survival is the goal. This means that, in order for the press to become a source 
of information rather than entertainment, informational news needs to start yielding a profit. 
Alternatively, the press would have to adhere to a new standard, separate from capitalist 
priorities. If people would rather read about celebrities and their personal lives, they need 
someone who can educate them for their own best will, even if they do not want it. Watch ing 
TV is easy. Reading glossies and calling it news is no challenge. Dragging people out of Plato’s 
cave and into the sunlight is hard and unthankful work, but, if people are to take democracy 
seriously again, perhaps necessary. Who is able to occupy this moral high ground, from which 
can be seen what “the people” need to know? 
 Greider argues it is the people themselves, who, through grassroots initiatives, can 
change the way they learn and govern. What does that mean for the status of Who Will Tell the 
People? Populists often call upon the wisdom of the people, whom they then proceed to 
educate.133 The book’s purpose is to lay the facts bare, to describe a blank field from which “the 
people” can once again take the government of their country in their own hands. At the same 
time, it is Greider himself who takes on the role of the educator, who enlightens ‘the people” on 
the predicament they are in. In this sense, he purports to have an overview and elevates himself 
as a leader, in that sense opposing himself to ‘the people” he claims to inform. This way, he 
satisfies his own criteria of being accessible and understandable to the layman, while 
simultaneously making a moral assessment, namely that things are not as they should be.  
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Conclusion 
 
Throughout his writing, Greider adopts a firmly critical stance on the entire American political 
system. At heart, he believes in the potential of the American people to inform themselves and 
to govern in a way that meets their demands. In this sense, his position is a naïve one that does 
not sufficiently question the supposed uniformity of the American population. His referral to 
“the people” is recurrent, and it seems to exist only in contrast with an elite, which has 
corrupted the political power invested in it by the rest of the country. This hits the core of the 
populist argument, where “the people” are named though not clearly identified. The populist 
speaker or party claims to represent “the people,” so that they can invest their democratic 
power in him or his party, and he can then restore their “rightful primacy” to them. 
 However, Greider is not a politician. Although this is a successful argument to gain the 
sympathy of the people,134 in this regard he steps away from the populist pattern, because he 
does not aspire political power himself. Rather, he wishes to inform “the people” of their 
predicament, and tell them what they can do about it. He points out that politicians consistently 
ignore “the people” when the population vocalizes its demands. Instead of constructing a 
populist argument, he is merely describing a real situation – one from which real populism often 
arises. 
 This urge to expose and describe derives from his background as a journalist, a 
profession he describes with a certain nostalgia in Who Will Tell the People. He laments the 
disappearance of old-fashioned journalism, arguing that modern journalists are too enmeshed 
with the politics they should be critically investigating. In a sense, it is a similar nostalgia that 
informs his argument regarding life in the United States. Secrets of the Temple questions the role 
of a single regulatory agency in relation to the people it governs. Who Will Tell the People 
critically examines what problems can arise when a democracy clashes with the cost-benefit 
analyses from big business. His more recent works One World, Ready or Not and The Soul of 
Capitalism question the impact of capitalism on individuals’ lives. The problems he establishes 
are of a moral ilk, and so are his proposed solutions. 
These solutions only apply in the broadest sense: citizens must inform each other by 
maintaining a local political dialogue through co-ops and focus groups. Greider’s argument 
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focuses on re-establishing political power as a system that works bottom-up, rather than top-
down. Because “the people” is such a diverse entity, his solutions cannot be concrete. He can 
only propose a new framework within which the ailments can be remedied. 
 In order to make that solution attainable, Greider is more an informer than a leader, 
more an educator than a politician. By explaining the country’s problems in accessible language, 
he hopes to empower them to take back their rightful primacy, rather than do it for them 
himself. The traditional news media, moreover, will no longer fill this role because doing so is 
bad for business. This is exactly his problem with the democratic system: because it has grown 
too distant from the voters, they have lost touch with and insight into what is happening to their 
country. He does not identify a responsible conspiracy, but rather blames it on fundamental 
flaws in the system of interaction between voters, politics, press and corporations. The main 
problem is that the laws of supply and demand, of cost and benefit, have superseded the laws of 
democracy, which has led to democratically accepted laws being bent under the force of those 
with money. 
 Due to the limited checks and balances, especially after the rampant deregulation of the 
1980s and 1990s, these effects have spread like wildfire throughout American society, leading to 
greater segregation between “the people” and ”the elite”, the latter being anybody with any 
kind of real power. These changes have manifested themselves in the powerlessness of 
regulatory agencies to adroitly oppose the force of monied corporations, and have thus 
corroded the government’s legitimacy. 
Rosanvallon identifies populist watchfulness as a compulsive disorder that as such is 
harmful to democracy. Greider's work shows that a populist critical approach to regulatory 
agencies' policy is not necessarily a bad thing, as he uses it to demonstrate the problems faced 
by the American public. This approach is not pathological, but revealing: critical analysis reveals 
underlying problems. Rosanvallon eschews populist critique for its supposed narrow-
mindedness, but Greider's distrust stems from problems with the way the entire democratic 
system malfunctions, rather than individual policies: he is distrustful because he focuses on a 
bigger picture. Greider is asking the question: why are these regulatory agencies no longer 
legitimizing the government’s authority? 
The bottom line of Greider’s problem is that the press, the political system and its 
regulatory agencies all have been absorbed by the economic powers of loss and benefits, in the 
words of Thomas Frank: “Today, […] American opinion leaders seem generally convinced that 
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democracy and the free market are simply identical.”135 In this sense, Greider’s writing is 
characterized by a nostalgic melancholy, a desire to return to a world in which the impact of 
supply and demand, of cost and revenue, were not so clearly noticeable. This is illustrated 
perhaps most clearly with the opening chapter of The Soul of Capitalism, in which Greider 
longingly describes his great-uncle’s old-fashioned farm and bucolic lifestyle amidst the 
oncoming capitalist industrialization of the surrounding area.   
Greider condemns the press for becoming complacent and glorifies the editors of the 
past, who critically investigated politicians and exposed unpleasant truths. In his description of 
the severe inflation of the 1970s he is perhaps overly optimistic, focusing on its equalizing effects 
rather than on the uncertainty that accompanied it. However, in the bleak current situation 
Greider sketches, this same idealism enables him to make a moral assertion and identify a 
problem that needs solving. Rather than simply describing from the sidelines, Greider is actively 
playing a part in a problematic situation, thus overstepping the usual line of distanced 
description favored in academia. He is trying to point his readers in the direction of self -
realization. Like the Populist Party and most populists before him, his view of the past is skewed 
by idealism, but this same glorification puts Greider in a position to assess what is wrong in 
today’s society. 
 
Thankfully, Greider’s books end on a positive note. In his final chapters, he continually reasserts 
his faith that the American system can restore itself, because “the people” are, on the whole, 
“quite remarkable, resourceful, and serious about their lives, often courageous in the worst 
circumstances.”136 Greider is firmly convinced that the tide can still be turned, although some 
claim that Greider is “such an optimist that even an empty glass looks half-full to him.”137 
Greider’s perspective on American society strikes a balance between academia and 
populism. On the one hand, his work is elaborately researched and well documented. He writes 
in a way that suggests objectivity, but at the same time it is prescriptive and highly moralistic. He 
prescribes the rightful position of “the people”’ and condemns big business, and American 
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democracy’s tendency to succumb to the influence of money. He argues that the press has 
abandoned its duty of informing, and instead is feeding the public what it wants to hear – not 
what it should hear. He is constructing a case using the age-old difference between “is” and 
“ought,” which is necessarily a moral standpoint, and thus subject to subjective discussion – 
generally an unwelcome guest in academia. His case is solid and optimistic, though perhaps far-
fetched and full of pipe dreams. At the same time, by condemning the current state of affairs, he 
is able to strengthen his argument and pull all the different facets together to build a conclusive 
narrative: if you agree that a democracy should represent its people, then the rest follows. The 
American political system does not properly represent its constituents, and Grei der explains why 
not, his books reading like a journalist’s well-researched, not to mention rather voluminous, op-
ed piece. 
His conclusions on ‘supply-side economics’ and the interaction between the Fed, the 
upper class and the American economy in Secrets of the Temple have recently been corroborated 
statistically by Thomas Piketty, whose extensive research on the subject, Capital in the 21st 
Century provides statistic substantiation for the claim that tax cuts and the curbing of inflation 
do not benefit the entire population equally. More importantly, he also underpins the 
significance of the question Greider sets out to answer in Who Will Tell the People: why have 
Americans consistently voted against their own best interest?138 Finally, Piketty’s research also 
shows that “there is no natural spontaneous process to prevent destabilizing, inegalitarian forces 
from prevailing permanently.”139 This, in turn, reestablishes the need for powerful regulatory 
agencies that are capable of withstanding the economic pressure exerted on them by 
corporations. This call is echoed by other modern writers, such as Thomas Frank, who argue in 
favor of a new strong government that can prevent corporations’ influence from rising above 
democratic law.140 
By examining the powerlessness of regulatory agencies to enforce the will of “the 
people,” we can begin to understand why populist parties are gaining power. Because the  
rational vote no longer yields the desired results, people become more inclined to vote on an 
emotion basis. Greider shows that this feeling of neglect is not unsubstantiated, but the result of 
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an ongoing process where democratic values have yielded for financial priorities. This populist 
investigation is a significant insight in today's state of affairs. We can now understand the 
transnational rise of populism as a symptom of democratic authority being marginalized by 
economic cost-benefit analyses. 
 
Analyzing Greider’s work has confirmed that populism is not a clear-cut definition, but more 
importantly, that populist elements do not have to hinder a text from being informative. He is 
able to explain why and how, over the past four decennia, American voters have seen their 
democratic power abused to the extent where their votes no longer serve their own best 
interest – and, equally important, why that matters. In a time which is characterized by an 
overabundance of freely available information, such a steering commentary is of great 
importance. Information is everywhere, but its importance to people’s personal lives is often left 
unclear. That is what makes Greider’s writings an important addition to the academic literature 
available: it is a perspective that offers insights in the moral implications of what is happening in 
our lives, thus bridging the gap between academic objectivity and moral subjectivity. 
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